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ABSTRACT 
 
Taxpayer audits are a central feature of the voluntary compliance system in the United States 
federal individual income tax.  Audits are thought to have a direct deterrent effect on the 
individuals actually audited.  Audits are also believed to have an indirect deterrent effect on 
individuals not audited, and in fact there is some empirical evidence that audit rates affect 
compliance beyond the audited individuals themselves.  However, empirical studies cannot 
measure or control for taxpayer awareness of audit risk, and they also cannot uncover the 
behavioral channels through which the direct and indirect effects operate; that is, the ways in 
which taxpayers learn about – and communicate among themselves – audit rates, and the 
subsequent effects on compliance, are not known and cannot be discovered by empirical studies.  
In this study, we use laboratory experiments to examine several types of information 
dissemination and taxpayer communication about audit frequency and audit results.  These 
experiments allow us to test hypotheses about the effects of two types of communication of audit 
policies and results, in order to explore the direct and the indirect effects of audits: “official” 
information disseminated by the “government” (e.g., the experimenter) and “unofficial”, or 
informal, communications among “taxpayers” (e.g., the subjects).  Our results indicate that 
“unofficial” communications have a strong indirect effect on compliance: messages that indicate 
that a subject was not audited or was able to cheat actually reduce compliance, while messages 
that a subject was audited or paid his or her taxes increase compliance.  Also, “official” 
announcements of information may not always encourage voluntary compliance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Taxpayer audits are a central feature of the voluntary compliance system in the United 
States federal individual income tax.  Audits are thought to have a direct deterrent effect on the 
individuals actually audited.  In addition, audits are believed to have an indirect deterrent effect 
on individuals not audited, and in fact there is some empirical evidence that changes in audit 
rates affect compliance beyond the audited individuals themselves.  For example, in an 
econometric study using U.S. state-level reporting data for the years 1977 to 1986, Dubin, Graetz 
and Wilde (1990) find that, for every dollar of revenue produced because of taxpayer audits, an 
additional six dollars of revenue were generated from the indirect or “ripple” effects.  More 
recent work by Dubin (2004) estimates an even larger ripple effect, at 8 to 12.  Tauchen, Witte, 
and Beron (1989) use taxpayer audit data from the 1969 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement 
Program (TCMP), and find that raising the audit rate had overall a smaller but still significant 
impact, and one felt only by high-income wage and salary workers; for this group of taxpayers, 
they estimate an indirect effect that is almost three times the direct revenue effect. 
Given the importance of audits in the voluntary compliance system of the U.S., it is 
significant that taxpayer audit rates have fallen dramatically since the 1960s, and have continued 
their decline in recent years.  In the early 1960s the percentage of individual tax returns that were 
audited by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was about 6 percent, and this percentage fell to 
2.5 percent by the mid-1970s.  Over the next decade, the audit rate fell further to roughly 1 
percent.  According to the Inspector General for Tax Analysis report in 2002, taxpayer audit 
rates have fallen another 56 percent between 1997 and 2001.  As a result, at present well less 
than 1 percent of all individual tax returns are audited.  Seen in the context of the Tauchen, 
Witte, and Beron (1989), Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990), and Dubin (2004) studies, the effect 
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of declining audit rates is not confined to the direct effect due to fewer audited taxpayers.  
Rather, there is an indirect effect that extends to taxpayers in general, who respond to the 
reduced overall probability of audit by lowering their compliance. 
For example, it is estimated that government coffers have been shortchanged by $7.2 
billion of “real money” as a direct result of lower audit frequency.1  However, as significant as 
the dollar amount lost directly because of lower audit rates is, it may pale in comparison to the 
dollars lost indirectly through taxpayer responses as they become aware of lower audit risk; that 
is, if the indirect effect of audits is larger than the direct effect, then the revenue cost of reduced 
audit rates is significantly greater than $7.2 billion, perhaps from 3 to 12 times as much. 
However, the magnitude and, especially, the underlying cause of these indirect impacts 
are still largely speculative.  Indirect effects of audits must ultimately arise through the 
information about audit probabilities and outcomes that is communicated among taxpayers.  
Such information may serve to refine individual estimates of audit probabilities.  While overall 
audit rates are quite low, among certain income and occupation classes they are more frequent.  
To the extent that communication takes place within such cohorts, this may serve to increase 
audit awareness and thus compliance.  Audits of others may also convey a reminder effect, 
reminding individuals that audits do occur even if they themselves have no personal experiences.   
Despite the insights from empirical studies using field data, these studies cannot measure 
or control for taxpayer awareness of audit risk, and they also cannot uncover the channels 
through which information dissemination and taxpayer communication work.  As a result, there 
is no evidence on the impact on compliance – if any – of the ways in which audit information is 
disseminated among taxpayers or communicated by taxpayers.  Put differently, the effects on 
                                                 
1 See the U.S. Department of the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) (2002). 
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compliance of the ways in which taxpayers learn about – and communicate among themselves – 
audit rates are not known, and simply cannot be addressed or discovered by empirical studies. 
More generally, in fact, the ways in which audits deter taxpayers from evading, whether 
from their direct or indirect effects, is not well understood.  According to Plumley (1996), “[i]t is 
generally believed … that many taxpayers would perceive increased auditing by IRS as an 
increase in their chances of being audited, and that they would improve their voluntary 
compliance as a result.”  From this description, it is clear that audit-based deterrence depends on 
taxpayer awareness of the level and year-to-year change in examination rates as a necessary, 
though not a sufficient, condition. Therefore, a valid test for the existence of indirect effects must 
ensure taxpayers are aware of the likelihood of audit. However, it is unlikely that such awareness 
can be gleaned from data based on random taxpayer audits. A greater degree of control is 
possible in field studies, but such data also may contain a broad array of exogenous influences, 
such as changes in tax law or economic conditions that may cause taxpayers to change their 
behavior during the period of study.  Indeed, some recent research (Alm and McKee, 2004) 
suggests that the presence of random audits is necessary if the systematic audits are to be 
effective; that is, random and systematic audits are complementary beyond the direct use of 
random audits to verify the efficacy of the systematic selection rules. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the roles of information dissemination and 
taxpayer communication on voluntary compliance.  Since the questions pertaining to the indirect 
effects of audits are behavioral, we follow a lengthy tradition (Friedland, Maital, and Rutenberg, 
1978; Spicer and Everett, 1982; Becker, Buchner, and Sleeking, 1987; Webley, Robben, Elffers, 
and Hessing1991; Alm, Jackson and McKee, 1992; Sour, 2001) by utilizing a laboratory market 
setting to investigate the underlying behavioral factors contributing to the indirect effects of 
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audits, especially the ways in which information and communication affect compliance.  In 
particular, we examine several types of communication about audits and audit results using 
laboratory market experiments in which the audit setting and communication opportunities are 
controlled.  In the base case sessions, the subjects receive no further information about audit 
results beyond their own audit experience.  In a second treatment the same objective audit rates 
are in effect, and subjects are also told by the experimenter the official audit rate for the period 
(as well as the actual number of audits and the results of the audits in some versions of this 
treatment).  In a third treatment the subjects are offered the opportunity to send a “message” to 
the other participants about their audit experience; subjects may also choose to send no message; 
and subjects may choose to send a message that is truthful or not.  The experimental design 
therefore allows us to test hypotheses about the effects of two types of communication of audit 
policies and results, in order to explore the direct and the indirect effects of audits: “official” 
information disseminated by the “government” (e.g., the experimenter) and “unofficial”, or 
informal, communications among “taxpayers” (e.g., the subjects). 
Our results indicate that “unofficial” communications have a strong indirect effect.  
Taken as whole, such unofficial taxpayer-to-taxpayer communications generally result in higher 
compliance, although some forms of such communication actually reduce compliance.  For 
example, communication about who experienced an audit and whether this individual complied 
with income reporting both lead to higher compliance, while communication that individuals 
were not audited or that they had not complied tends to lower overall compliance.  Indirect 
effects of audits therefore exist, but are more complicated than simple demonstration effects.   
Official information dissemination also has complicated effects on compliance.  Announcing the 
official audit rate on balance increases compliance, but reporting the actual number of audits 
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conducted in the previous round does not lead to higher compliance; that is, official information 
has a somewhat mixed impact on compliance.  We are also able to estimate the ripple effect of 
audits.  On average, we calculate this ripple effect at roughly 4, or a number somewhere between 
the estimates of Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1989) and those of Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990) 
and of Dubin (2004). 
The next section gives a brief overview of the relevant theory of taxpayer compliance.  
Section 3 discusses our experimental design, and section 4 suggests several hypotheses.  Section 
5 presents our experimental results, and in the final section we discuss our conclusions. 
 
2. THEORY 
The economic model of income tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) is based on 
the economics-of-crime approach pioneered by Becker (1968).  This model focuses on the 
income reporting behavior of taxpayers, and ignores other forms of evasion such as non-
payment, excessive reporting of deductions, and non-filing.2  In its simplest form (ignoring labor 
supply effects), an individual is assumed to receive an income I and to choose how much of this 
income to declare to the tax authorities.  The individual pays taxes at rate t on every dollar D of 
income that is declared, while no taxes are paid on underreported income.  However, the 
individual may be audited with a fixed, random probability p; if audited, then all underreported 
income is discovered, and the individual must pay a penalty at rate f on each dollar that he or she 
underreported.  The individual's income IC if caught underreporting equals IC=I-tD-f[t(I-D)], 
while if underreporting is not caught income IN is IN=I-tD.   
                                                 
2 Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, and McKee (2001) have investigated the effect of alternative forms of evasion, and 
find that individuals respond to relative enforcement by choosing the evasion mode with the lower expected penalty. 
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An expected utility maximizing individual chooses declared income to maximize the 
expected utility EU(I) of the evasion gamble, or 
EU(I) = pU(IC ) + (1-p)U(IN ),       (1) 
where E  is the expectation operator and utility U(I) is a function only of income.  This 
optimization generates a standard first-order condition for an interior solution; given concavity of 
the utility function, the second-order condition will be satisfied.3 
Comparative statics results are easily derived.  It is straightforward to show that an 
increase in the probability of detection p and the penalty rate f unambiguously increase declared 
income.4  An increase in income has an ambiguous effect on declared income, which depends 
upon the individual’s attitude toward risk.  If the individual exhibits decreasing absolute risk 
aversion, then higher incomes (and wealth) are associated with lower levels of compliance. 
The standard model has been modified in a number of ways.5  A variation that illustrates 
quite simply the fiscal incentives for compliance is to assume that the individual is risk neutral.  
As shown by Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992a) and Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992), a 
risk-neutral individual will determine the amount of income to declare to tax authorities (D) 
based on the following expected value (EV) relationship, or 
EV = I – td – pf [t(I – D)].        (2) 
                                                 
3 The first- and second-order conditions are, respectively (where each prime denotes a derivative), 
 
∂ EU(I)/∂D = pt(f-1)U’(IC ) - (1-p)tU’(IN ) = 0 
 
∂2 EU(I)/∂D2 = p[t(f-1)]2 U”(IC ) + (1-p)t2 U”(IN ) < 0. 
4 For example, total differentiation of the first-order condition demonstrates that the impact of a change in the 
probability of audit on declared income is given by 
 
∂D/∂p = -[t(f-1)U’(IC ) + tU’(IN )]/[pt2(f-1)2U”(IC ) + (1-p)t2U”(IN )]. 
 
Given the second-order conditions (and the obvious requirement that f>1), the sign of this expression is 
unambiguously positive.  Other comparative statics results are similarly derived. 
5 See Cowell (1990) and Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) for a discussion of the standard evasion model and 
its variants. 
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Maximizing EV with respect to D indicates that an individual will optimally report all income 
when  pf > 1 , and will report zero income if the inequality is reversed.  Using this inequality, we 
can determine the combination of audit rates and fine rates that will induce a risk neutral 
individual to report all income.  For example, when f equals 2, then the audit rate must exceed 50 
percent to induce taxpayers to report all of their income; if the fine rate equals 5, then the audit 
rate must exceed 20 percent.  Similarly, if the audit rate equals 1 percent, then any fine rate less 
than 100 will lead a risk-neutral individual to report zero income. 
These examples illustrate a standard result: given actual audit and fine rates (and standard 
levels of risk aversion), most people should rationally choose to cheat.  The incorporation of 
risk-aversion certainly affects these calculations, but even so the basic expected utility model of 
tax evasion (and its many variants) is generally unable to explain observed compliance rates. 
However, incorporating non-expected utility behavior into the analysis (e.g., individuals 
exhibiting loss aversion or more extreme forms of risk aversion, such as a rank dependent 
expected utility) can provide predictions of compliance more consistent with observed behavior 
(Bernasconi, 1998).  For example, for individuals described by a rank dependent expected utility 
model, we can modify the basic maximization problem of equation (1) to one in which 
individuals maximize 
EU(I) = gpU(IC ) + (1-g)(1-p)U(IN ),      (3) 
where g serves to overweight the probability of the “bad” outcome (or detection and 
punishment).   This alternative approach also helps illuminate the roles of information 
dissemination and communication.  Either official information provided by the tax authority or 
taxpayer-to-taxpayer communication that describes audits and penalties is likely to increase the 
weighted probability of an audit.  In contrast, if the information and/or communication highlights 
 10
the absence of audits or their lack of effectiveness, we would expect that they would lower the 
weighted probability of an audit.  Note that individuals who exhibit such rank dependent 
expected utility are likely to respond less to reports of the absence of audits, and thus the overall 
effect of communication should be to increase tax compliance beyond the level consistent with 
objective audit probabilities, a result consistent with the field data. 
 Even so, in all of these analyses it is still assumed that taxpayers know the actual audit 
probability and penalties.  What is unavoidably and necessarily missing from the empirical work 
of Tauchen, Witte, and Beron (1989), Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990), and Dubin (2004) is a 
model of the manner by which information concerning the true audit probability and the levied 
fines is communicated among and understood by the taxpayers.  The IRS does not generally 
announce that it will be raising or lowering the audit rate, even though this information is 
available.  As emphasized by Plumley (1996), an open empirical question is how a taxpayer 
forms an assessment of the probability of audit and then responds to changes in this audit rate.  
Put differently, we do not know how information is disseminated and communicated: how do 
taxpayers learn that the audit rate is declining and thereby adjust their behavior to generate the 
reported result?  We address this learning phenomenon in our experimental design, as discussed 
in the next section. 
 
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The experimental design captures the essential features of the voluntary income reporting 
and tax assessment system used in many countries.6  Human subjects in a controlled laboratory 
environment earn income through their performance in a task.  The actual income earned is 
                                                 
6  The full set of experimental instructions is available upon request. 
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determined by the relative performance in this task.  The subjects must decide how much of this 
income to report to a tax agency.  Taxes are paid on reported income, and no taxes are paid on 
unreported income.  However, unreported income may be discovered via a random audit, and the 
subject must then pay the owed taxes plus a fine based on the unpaid taxes.7  This reporting, 
audit, and penalty process is repeated for a given number of rounds that each represent a tax 
period, and is replicated with different sets of subjects.  At the completion of the experiment, 
each subject is paid earnings equal to the laboratory market earnings converted to U.S. dollars. 
Since these are experiments designed to inform policy makers, they must satisfy Smith’s 
(1982) precept of “parallelism”.  Parallelism is satisfied when the experimental setting captures 
the essential elements of the decision problem faced in the naturally occurring setting.  It is not 
necessary (nor is it desirable) that the experiment setting implement all of the complexity of the 
naturally occurring setting (Plott, 1987).  As implemented, our experimental design follows the 
main elements of Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992a, 1992b, 1993) and Alm, McClelland, and 
Schulze (1992), but incorporates some additional features to improve parallelism with taxpayers’ 
decision making in the naturally occurring world.  For example, in the current design, subjects 
earn income by performing a task (rather than receiving an endowment), they disclose income, 
and they face an audit process similar to that in the naturally occurring setting.  Also, these 
experiments utilize tax language in the instructions and in the computer interface used to present 
information and elicit income reporting behavior.  While the stakes are small, the decision setting 
is also simplified relative to that of the natural setting. 
                                                 
7 It may be argued that current audit practice implements purely endogenous audits, since a taxpayer either elicits an 
audit or not depending on his or her “score” in an audit rule.  However, whether a taxpayer is actually audited 
depends on the score and on the audit budget of the tax authority.  Since the taxpayer cannot know this latter item 
with certainty, there remains a random component to the audit process. 
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The policy question is the nature of the indirect effect of audits.  The design specifically 
addresses this question by varying the information conveyed to subjects about audit probabilities,  
by providing various types of audit result information to the subjects, and by allowing taxpayer 
communication in some settings. 
Subjects are recruited from undergraduate classes in economics and business.8  Upon 
arrival at the lab, the subjects are organized into groups of six to eight persons with multiple 
groups in each session.  The subjects do not know who is in their group, only the number in their 
group and the presence of at least two groups in the session.  Basic instructions are provided via 
hardcopy while the main instructions are provided via a series of computer screens and practice 
rounds.  Subjects are not allowed to communicate with one another during the session except 
when allowed via the computer interface.  They are told that the experiment will last an unknown 
number of periods; in actual practice the number of sessions is predetermined, and the sessions 
last for 30 real rounds.  After the practice rounds are completed, any final procedural questions 
are answered.  The full experiment then begins.  Sessions last approximately 90 minutes.  
Subject earnings range from $19 to $37, depending upon subject performance during the 
experiment.  Subjects are told that payments will be made in private at the end of the session, 
that all responses are anonymous, and that the only record of participation that contains their 
name is the receipt signed when they receive their payments. 
 The earnings task requires the subjects to sort the digits 1 through 9 into the correct order 
from a randomized order presented in a 3 by 3 matrix.  They do this by pointing the computer 
                                                 
8 Recruiting was conducted through announcements in various classes and a sign up via a web page in which the 
subjects posted their contact information and the time blocks of their availability.  Subjects were permitted to 
participate in only one tax experiment, although other experimental projects were ongoing at the time and many 
participated in other types of experiments.  We actively discourage “snowball” sampling in which recruited subjects 
bring additional subjects to a session.  When we recruit subjects, we do not reveal the exact nature of the 
experiment.  All experiments were conducted at the University of Tennessee. 
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mouse at the numbers and “clicking” on the numbers in the correct sequence.  On the computer 
screen a 3 by 3 matrix with the digits in random order appears on the right side of the screen and 
as the numbers are “clicked” they appear in a 3 by 3 matrix on the left side of the screen.  (See 
Appendix A.)  A counter on the screen shows the elapsed time from when the first number is 
“clicked”, and, when all nine have been ordered, the subject clicks the “Continue” button to 
transmit this time to the server.  Actual income is determined by the relative speed of 
performance, with the fastest performer receiving the highest income and the slowest performer 
receiving the lowest income.  Once all subjects have completed the income task, they are 
informed via the computer of their income for the round and presented with a screen that 
resembles a tax form in which they report their income (Appendix B).  This screen informs the 
subjects of the tax policy information in effect for the session.  In all treatments they are 
informed of the current tax rate and the penalty rate applied to non-disclosed income.  In some 
treatments the subjects are told the probability of an audit, while in others they must infer this 
from their own experience and, depending on the treatment, on the post-audit information 
provided.  As noted above, these experiments present the instructions and computer interface 
using tax language.  In keeping with the central objective of this investigation, certain parameters 
(e.g., the tax rate and the penalty rate) are fixed throughout the experiments so that we may focus 
on the effect of information concerning audit results.  All audits investigate only the current 
period disclosure. 
The experimental design implements three basic treatments, as shown in Table 1.  There 
are four different audit rates employed (0.05, 0.10, 0.30 and 0.40), and these are applied in each 
of the information treatments.  The tax rate is set at 0.35 throughout the experiments, and the fine 
rate is set at 150 percent in all sessions.  There is no public good financed by the tax payments.  
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The currency used in the experiment is called “lab dollars”, and subjects are told that all lab 
dollars they earn during the experiment will be redeemed for cash at the end of the experiment at 
a fixed conversion rate of 90 lab dollars per 1 U.S. dollar. 
 There are several ways in which information regarding the audit activity of the tax 
authority can reach the taxpayers and, potentially, affect their compliance behavior.  In our 
experimental design, we investigate two different information transmission mechanisms.  In the 
first mechanism, the subjects are provided some “official” information from the tax authority.  
The simplest information here is a public announcement of the audit probability that subjects 
face in any given round.  In some sessions (denoted “A” in Table 1), the audit rate is announced; 
in other sessions (denoted “B” in Table 1), the audit rate is not announced.  A different form of 
“official” information is the actual number of audits that occurred in the previous period (and the 
results of these audits), and this information on audit results is announced in some sessions 
(Treatment 2, or T2 in Table 1) and not in others (T1 in Table 1).  We also combine these official 
information treatments, to give T1A, T1B, T2A, and T2B. 
In some other sessions (T3), we allow subjects to send one message in each round to all 
other persons in their group; each person may send at most one message in a round, and all 
subjects in the group receive the message.  The possible messages are reported in Table 2.  We 
refer to this as “unofficial” information, in which taxpayer-to-taxpayer communication may 
affect behavior, and we combine this unofficial treatment with announcement of the audit rate 
(T3A) and non-announcement of the audit rate (T3B).  This process works as follows.  Before 
the next round begins, the subjects receive a screen that reports the messages sent by the others 
in their group.  The information is presented in a table showing the frequency of each message.  
Since the actual number of audits is not reported in this setting, there is no means by which the 
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subjects can verify whether this information is truthful9, and indeed the experimental setting does 
not impose the requirement that the information be truthful. 
At the end of the experiment, we also ask the subjects to report their age, gender and 
whether they prepare and file their own taxes.  If they respond “No” to this last question, we 
assume that their parents are responsible for tax preparation, given that our subjects are typically 
college sophomores or juniors. 
 The process of determining who is audited is given by a computerized draw.  In sessions 
in which the audit probability is announced, the subjects are presented with a computerized 
representation of a bucket in which a draw is made.  In this bucket there are 20 balls with the 
number of blue ones determining the audit probability.  A white ball signifies “no audit”, and a 
blue one denotes an audit.  This approach is similar to that used in some previous evasion studies 
(Sour, 2001; Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, and McKee, 2001), but differs from Alm, Jackson, 
and McKee (1992a, 1992b, 1993) and Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992) where a mechanical 
bingo cage was used.  When the audit probabilities are not announced, the bingo cage does not 
appear on the screen; the subject simply receives a text message that reports whether she was 
audited or not.  After the subject reports income, there is a delay while the server performs a 
random process that is identical to that used by the virtual bingo cage and announces to the 
subject whether they were audited on not. 
 After the audit process has been completed, the subjects are presented a new screen that 
provides the earnings and audit outcome summary for the round.  Where taxpayer-to-taxpayer 
communication is allowed (T3A and T3B), the subjects then choose to send one of the messages 
reported in Table 2.  After all subjects have sent a message, the subjects receive further feedback 
                                                 
9  In the field, individuals may know the IRS audit results, and may also receive information from individuals that 
they know or know of.  However, the numbers of taxpayers in the field are so large that it is unlikely that one could 
combine these data to know whether the person with whom they were communicating spoke the truth. 
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in the form of a table that reports the number of persons sending each of the messages.  In the 
treatment (T2A and T2B) for which audit result information is provided by the tax authority, the 
subjects see a screen that reports the results of the audits: the number audited, the total fines 
collected, and the average fine collected.  All of these are the results for their group only. 
 A total of 326 subjects participated in the experiments.  The number of subjects 
participating in each treatment is shown in Table 1, where some summary statistics for each of 
the treatments are also reported. 
 
4. BEHAVIORAL HYPOTHESES 
 There are several basic behavioral hypotheses that are typically investigated in 
compliance studies.  Our focus is on the indirect effect of audits.  The experiments are designed 
to provide different forms of audit information and taxpayer communication, so that we can 
investigate the effects of information and communication on subsequent compliance behavior.  
In particular, our design allows us to investigate the attributes of the information that contribute 
to increased compliance and those that lead to reduced compliance.  We also investigate the 
impacts of other variables on compliance.  For example, as discussed above, expected utility 
maximizers (as well as those exhibiting rank dependent expected utility) are predicted to increase 
their declared income when the audit probability increases.  The effects of income and “wealth” 
(or accumulated income) depend upon risk attitudes.  The effect of past audits on individual 
compliance behavior is ambiguous.  The taxpayer may use the audit experience to update his or 
her probability of being audited in the future.  Such updating can lead to lower or higher future 
compliance.  The “gambler’s fallacy” – the notion that “If I was audited in the last round, then 
there is less chance I will be audited this round” – will lead to lower compliance after an audit.  
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However, if the individual feels he or she had underestimated the probability of an audit, then, 
assuming a Bayesian updating process, the response to an audit will be to increase the estimated 
probability and thereby to increase compliance in the future. 
 Again, our focus is on information and communication.  In the real world, individuals 
have varying levels of information regarding the objective probability of an audit.  The tax 
authority may formally announce an audit rate, there may be less precise information reported in 
the press, or the audit rate (and audit process) may be a complete secret.  The available 
information allows individuals to form priors regarding the probability that they will be audited.  
Although the announced audit probability is predicted to influence behavior directly, it is likely 
that taxpayers make use of other types of information to refine their subjective estimates of 
individual audit probabilities.  For example, the tax authority may also announce the results of 
any audits actually undertaken in the previous period, including the number of individuals 
audited, the total fines levied, and/or the average fine levied.  The less certain (or more diffuse) 
the prior audit probability, the more such official information may be used to allow individuals to 
update their audit prospects. 
The impact on compliance of this official information is uncertain.  Individuals with rank 
dependent expected utility preferences will focus on the “bad” outcome (e.g., being audited), and 
so official information regarding audit rates and the results of audits of others will lead them to 
update their priors so as to increase their subjective audit risk.  These individuals will therefore 
increase compliance relative to what they would have done based on their priors, so that we 
expect that the “official” announcement effect will be to increase compliance.  However, the 
provision of official information may also convey to individuals that audits do not have as severe 
an impact as expected.  In this case, individuals will adjust their priors to lower the negatives 
 18
associated with an audit, thereby reducing compliance.  Overall, we expect that the “official” 
announcement effect will be to increase compliance, as reflected in the following hypotheses: 
H1: The official announcement of the audit probability will, ceteris paribus, increase 
compliance. 
 
H2: The official announcement of the audit result (e.g., the number of individuals audited, 
the fines collected) in the previous period will, ceteris paribus, increase compliance. 
 
 There is also “unofficial” information, or information communicated by taxpayers.  
Individual taxpayers may engage in communication with friends and acquaintances concerning 
their experiences at the hands of the tax auditors.  Here the issue is whether taxpayer 
communication concerning audit selection and audit outcomes leads to higher or lower 
compliance.  If we continue to assume that individuals underestimate the probability of audit and 
overestimate the success of the audit agency, then communication about audits and audit results 
will work in the same direction as the official release of information.  Under expected utility 
theory, both types of information during communication will have the same positive effect on 
compliance; under non-expected utility models, individuals will overweight information that 
audits are successful, and so will again increase their compliance.10 
However, matters are obviously more complicated.  To the extent that paying taxes is 
viewed as a social contract (Alm, Jackson and McKee, 1993), communication that others comply 
will lead to higher compliance, but communication that others cheat will lower compliance; that 
is, communication regarding taxpayer behavior will establish – either increasing or decreasing –  
the “social norm” of compliance. 
                                                 
10  Note that Alm and McKee (2004) investigate the effects of pre-filing communication on tax reporting behavior 
when the tax authority has the policy of selecting individuals for audit on the basis of relative reporting behavior.  
They find that, in such a coordination game, taxpayers are able to focus on the lower compliance Nash equilibrium 
when the taxpayers are able to communicate with one another.  
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The range of possible unofficial messages in Table 2 is quite large, but these messages 
may be usefully grouped for our analysis.  For example, there are two messages (5 and 7) that the 
individual complies with the tax law, while two messages (4 and 6) report evasion.  Three 
messages report that one was audited (3, 5, and 7), and three report that one was not audited (2, 
4, and 5).  These classifications allow us to investigate the relative effects of taxpayer 
communication that may have either a positive or a negative effect on compliance: 
H3 (Social Norm): Reports that others comply with the tax rules will lead to higher 
compliance on the part of individuals receiving this information.  Similarly, reports that 
others do not comply will lead to lower compliance. 
 
H4 (Indirect Effects): Reports that others have been audited will lead to higher 
compliance on the part of individuals receiving this information.  Similarly, reports that 
others have not been audited will lead to lower compliance. 
 
It should be noted that we do not evaluate the veracity of the unofficial communication.  
The purpose of the present analysis is to investigate the effects of communication and the 
individuals in the experiment have no means to verify whether the information is truthful.  Thus, 
we simply incorporate the received information into the estimated compliance model.  Taxpayers 
are able to reveal information that is truthful or untruthful.  The experimental setting allows both, 
just as would arise in the naturally occurring setting. 
The next section presents our experimental results and our tests of these hypotheses. 
 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The simplest analysis of our experimental results examines descriptive statistics on the 
effects of the different treatments on average Compliance Rate, or calculated as the ratio of 
income declared by the subject to the tax authority to true income.  Aggregate statistics by 
treatment are shown in Table 1, where Compliance Rate is calculated as the simple average 
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across all subjects and all rounds of a given treatment.  Allowing unofficial taxpayer 
communication always increases compliance, especially in the absence of official announcement 
of the audit probability (T3B versus T1B). 
The impact of official information is more complicated.  When the official audit 
probability is announced (or Set A treatments), official announcement of the audit results 
actually lowers the average compliance rate (T2A versus T1A); when the audit probability is not 
announced (Set B treatments), official announcement of the audit results increases the 
compliance rate (T2B versus T1B). 
The effects of announcing the audit probability are also somewhat mixed in the 
aggregate.  There are three different comparisons that we can make here.  Comparing T1A to 
T1B (or treatments in which the audit results are not announced and there is no taxpayer 
communication), official information on the audit probability lowers the average compliance 
rate, from 59.4 percent in T1B to 51.5 percent in T1A.  When the audit results are announced 
(and subjects are still not allowed to communicate with one another), the further announcement 
of audit probabilities again lowers compliance; compare T2B with T2A.  Finally, the average 
compliance rate falls from 64.9 percent in T3B to 51.6 percent in T3A with the announcement of 
the audit probability (or treatments in which taxpayers are allowed to communicate and the audit 
results are not announced). 
These complex and interacting effects can be disentangled by looking at the individual-
level information.  The experimental data constitute a panel with 326 subjects and 30 decision 
rounds.  Each subject makes one decision in a round (or the amount of income to declare).  The 
variables that affect this decision are various economic factors (e.g., the income of the subject in 
the round), the experimental treatments (e.g., information and communication), and subject 
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characteristics.  Given this structure, there are several options for analyzing the data.  We have 
elected to utilize a panel estimation technique that allows us to address certain characteristics of 
the data at the expense of foregoing some other factors.  (Because of the experimental nature of 
the data, there is perfect correlation between subjects and experimental treatment variables, so 
that we cannot use a subject fixed effects estimation method.)  We also collect some subject 
characteristic data, and we find that these systematically affect estimated compliance behavior.  
However, we acknowledge that we may be missing some unobservable effects that could be 
addressed with a subject random effects estimation approach.  The distributional assumptions 
required of a random effects estimation do not seem to be justified here.  Hence, we opt for the 
use of the cross-section time series estimation utilizing a generalized least squares estimator 
incorporating panel-specific heteroskedastic error terms.11 
The experimental design suggests that the Compliance Rate of a taxpayer in each round 
depends upon such factors as the individual’s actual (or “true”) earned Income in the round, the 
Wealth (or the accumulated earnings of the individual up to that round), individual 
characteristics, and variables that represent the experimental treatments on information and 
communication.  The individual characteristics include a dummy variable for whether the 
individual has experience with preparing his or her own tax return (Own Prepared Tax), a 
dummy variable for gender (Male) to control for any systematic effects across subjects due to 
gender, and a variable (Age) to control for subject age. 
The information and communication variables are constructed from the experimental 
design.  The information and communication variables are of several types.  “Official” 
information includes the announcement of the official audit probability (Audit Probability 
Announced) and of the audit results (Audit Results Announced).  “Unofficial” communication 
                                                 
11 All estimations are undertaken using the xtgls estimation in STATA release 8. 
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among the subjects includes the possibility of sending any type of message (Unofficial 
Communication), as well as the four different combinations of these messages.  Definitions and 
summary statistics for all variables are reported in Table 3. 
We report the results of various specifications in Table 4.  The simplest specification has 
only subject factors; this is reported as Model 1.  The results for this specification demonstrate 
that the subjects in these experiments exhibit behavior similar to that reported in much previous 
compliance research.12  The compliance rate is decreasing in wealth and in income.  We also find 
that compliance increases with age and is lower for males.  Interestingly, the compliance rate is 
lower for individuals reporting that they prepare their own tax returns. 
More interesting results emerge as we investigate the effects of various information and 
communication treatments to understand the indirect effects of audits.  In Model 2 it is clear that 
the provision of official information on the audit rate (Audit Probability Announced, interacted 
with the Audit Probability, or H1) increases compliance, by 6.7 percentage points (relative to an 
overall average compliance rate of 55.3 percent).  In contrast, official announcement of the 
results of audits reduces compliance (H2), as does Lagged Audit interacted with Audit 
Probability Announced.  Given the magnitude of the coefficients on these three official 
information variables, however, official information on balance has a small positive impact on 
the compliance rate (by 1.4 percentage points). 
In Model 3 we introduce taxpayer communication as a simple dummy variable 
(Unofficial Communication) for whether this was allowed.  We find that this leads to higher 
compliance by 4.5 percentage points.  However, we can organize the data to identify the effects 
of different types of communication (Model 4), and learn more about the transmission of such 
unofficial information.  In Model 4 we see that messages that report evasion lead to lower 
                                                 
12 For example, see Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992b). 
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compliance (Unofficial Message – Subjects Evaded), while those reporting compliance 
(Unofficial Message – Subjects Complied) lead to higher compliance (H3).  The relative 
magnitude of the effects suggests that the compliance behavior messages increase compliance by 
marginally more than the evasion messages lower compliance.  This result is consistent with the 
effect of a positive effect of social norms.  Elsewhere, social norms have been shown to increase 
cooperative behavior, of which tax compliance is but one example (Cummings et al., 2004). 
A similar asymmetric result occurs in Model 4 for the effect of messages reporting audit 
events (H4).  Messages that convey past audits (Unofficial Message – Subjects Audited) increase 
overall compliance while those that convey the absence of audits (Unofficial Message – Subjects 
Not Audited) lower compliance.  Again, the relative magnitude of these effects indicates that 
compliance on balance increases, by 2.0 percentage points.  “Bad” news appears to have a 
greater impact, a result that is consistent with individuals adopting non-expected utility behavior.  
Decision models that emphasize such “bad” outcomes predict that individuals will overweight 
the likelihood of events that generate losses. 
Despite the potential for multicollinearity in Model 4, on balance we see that the 
individual messages that a tax authority would regard as compliance-increasing (e.g., audited and 
complied messages) jointly contribute more to compliance than do messages that the authority 
would regard as compliance-decreasing. 
Summary statistics for overall goodness-of-fit generally improve as we read across Table 
4, from Model 1 through Model 4, and the coefficients on the common subject variables are quite 
stable across the various specifications.  We find that Unofficial Communication improves 
compliance, even when the individual messages are included as separate variables in Model 4.  
However, the possibility exists for such communication to worsen compliance if the information 
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conveys the weakness of the audit process and the extent of noncompliance.  This result is 
potentially worrisome for the tax authority. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 Of perhaps most interest are our findings that the official provision of audit information 
by the tax authority has a small positive effect on subsequent compliance and that the provision 
of unofficial information via communication by the taxpayers themselves also generally 
increases compliance.  However, informal communication works to increase subsequent 
compliance among the taxpayers when the communication is related to being audited.  While not 
directly addressed in this paper, our data provide support for the presence of social norms in tax 
compliance decisions. 
Our results show that the effect of audits is not limited to those actually audited.  In fact, 
we can compute the magnitude of this indirect effect that we have been investigating, following 
the same general procedures as in Dubin (2004).  The audits yield revenues equal to the tax owed 
plus penalties.  Since individuals who are not actually audited do in fact pay taxes, the indirect 
effect of the audit mechanism can be computed as taxes collected from those not audited divided 
by the total audit yield.  For all sessions taken together this ratio is 4.4; that is, the ripple effect of 
audits is 4.4, and total taxes collected are some 440 percent greater than the revenues collected 
via the audit process itself.  This indirect effect is similar to, though somewhat lower than, 
estimates reported by Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1990) and by Dubin (2004), and somewhat 
larger than those of Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1989), all of which are generated from field 
data. 
 25
Our focus here is on the response of taxpayers to the information provided by other 
taxpayers.  Thus, we do not evaluate whether the transmitted information is truthful or not.  The 
taxpayers in our experiment would have no means of evaluating the veracity of the 
communicated information.  Our experiments address some of the behavioral questions 
concerning the mechanism by which the indirect audit effects are manifest.  We find that 
information regarding audit experiences of others does have an effect.  It is interesting to note 
that there is an asymmetry in taxpayer responses – messages that report audits and compliance 
have a larger absolute effect – and this finding supports the overall result that unofficial 
communication among taxpayers has the potential to increase overall compliance beyond the 
levels that individual audits alone provide. 
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Table 1 – Experimental Design and Aggregate Results a 
Set A – Audit Probability Announced Unofficial Taxpayer Communication? 
Official Information? No Yes 
Do Not Publicly Announce Audit Results T1A 
Subjects=48 
Compliance Rate=0.515 
Tax Revenue=17.6% 
Audit Yield=$13.64 
T3A 
Subjects=62 
Compliance Rate=0.516 
Tax Revenue=17.9% 
Audit Yield=$17.67 
Publicly Announce Audit Results T2A 
Subjects=72 
Compliance Rate=0.445 
Tax Revenue=15.5% 
Audit Yield=$19.50 
 
  
Set B – Audit Probability Not Announced Unofficial Taxpayer Communication? 
Official Information? No Yes 
Do Not Publicly Announce Audit Results T1B 
Subjects=32 
Compliance Rate=0.594 
Tax Revenue= 0.7% 
Audit Yield=$16.36 
T3B 
Subjects=40 
Compliance Rate=0.649 
Tax Revenue=22.5% 
Audit Yield=$15.04 
Publicly Announce Audit Results T2B 
Subjects = 72 
Compliance Rate=0.646 
Tax Revenue = 22.4% 
Audit Yield = $16.18 
 
a  Treatments denoted A are those where the audit rate (probability) is announced, while those 
denoted B are where the audit probability is not announced.  All treatments last 30 rounds.  In all 
treatments, the tax rate is 0.35, the fine rate is 1.5, and subjects are organized into groups of six 
to eight persons.  The income range is the same for all sessions (the maximum is 100 lab dollars 
and the minimum is 60 lab dollars (for eight person groups), in increments of 10 lab dollars with 
2 persons in each income level).  Audit rates vary from 0.05 to 0.40 in all treatments.  
“Compliance Rate” is calculated by dividing declared income by true income, for all subjects 
and all rounds of a given treatment.  “Tax Revenue” is calculated by dividing taxes paid on 
declared income by taxes that would be paid if all income is reported, for all subjects and all 
rounds of a given treatment.  “Audit Yield” is calculated by summing taxes and penalties paid on 
undeclared income, for all subjects and all rounds of a given treatment.
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Table 2 – Possible Messages in Treatment 3a 
Message Message Content Number of Messages Sent 
1 Do not send a message 544 
2 I was not audited 681 
3 I was audited 281 
4 I was not audited and did not report all my taxes 549 
5 I was not audited and reported all my taxes 558 
6 I was audited and did not report all my taxes 253 
7 I was audited and reported all my taxes 194 
a  Subjects are only permitted to send one message from this list in each period, and the must send 
a message before they can proceed to the end of the current period.  There were 3060 messages 
sent in total during Treatment 3 (A and B). 
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Table 3 – Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Declared Income Income reported to tax authority 44.436 
(36.78) 
Compliance Rate Declared Income / (Earned) Income 0.553 
(0.45) 
Income Income earned via the earning task 80.860 
(11.95) 
Wealth Accumulated earnings to date 944.600 
(560.18) 
Audit Probability Probability of an audit 0.214 
(0.15) 
Audit Probability 
Announced 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if subjects are informed of the 
audit rate prior to reporting income and 0 otherwise 
0.558 
(0.50) 
Audit Probability 
Not Announced 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if subjects are not informed of 
the audit rate prior to reporting income and 0 otherwise 
0.442 
(0.50) 
Audit Results Announced Actual number of audits from previous round, reported via 
computer to subjects 
0.442 
(0.49) 
Unofficial 
Communication 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if any communication between 
subjects is allowed via computer and 0 otherwise 
0.313 
(0.47) 
Unofficial Message – 
Do Not Send a Messagea 
Number of subjects who choose the “Do not send a 
message” option – Table 2 
544 
(---) 
Unofficial Message –  
Subjects Not Auditeda 
Number of subjects in group sending a message that 
included not being audited (Messages 2, 4 and 5 – Table 2) 
1788 
(---) 
Unofficial Message –  
Subjects Auditeda 
Number of subjects in group sending a message that 
included being audited (Messages 3, 6 and 7 – Table 2) 
728 
(---) 
Unofficial Message –  
Subjects Evadeda 
Number of subjects in group sending a message that 
included tax evasion (Messages 4 and 6 – Table 2) 
802 
(---) 
Unofficial Message –  
Subjects Complieda 
Number of subjects in group sending a message that 
included tax compliance (Messages 5 and 7 – Table 2) 
752 
(---) 
Lagged Audit Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual was audited in 
the previous period and 0 otherwise 
0.216 
(0.41) 
Own Prepared Tax Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject says in post-
experiment survey that he or she prepares their own taxes 
and 0 otherwise 
0.341 
(0.47) 
Age Subject age as indicated by the subject in post-experiment 
survey 
20.13 
(3.02) 
Male Dummy variable equal to 1 if subject indicated in post-
experiment survey gender as male and 0 otherwise 
0.531 
(0.49) 
a  There were 3060 messages sent in total during Treatment 3 (A and B).  The numbers here do 
not add to 3060 due to repeated reporting of messages in the categories (e.g., Message 4 appears 
in two of the above classifications). 
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Table 4 – Estimation Results 
 Specifications 
Independent Variables Model 1 
Individual 
Factors Only 
Model 2 
Official 
Information 
Model 3 
Unofficial 
Communication 
Model 4 
All Unofficial 
Communication 
Constant 0.745*** 
(0.033) 
0.737*** 
(0.034) 
0.721*** 
(0.033) 
0.712*** 
(0.033) 
Income -0.067** 
(0.032) 
-0.068** 
(0.033) 
-0.070** 
(0.033) 
-0.063*** 
(0.033) 
Wealth -0.235*** 
(0.007) 
-0.237*** 
(0.007) 
-0.236*** 
(0.007) 
-0.229*** 
(0.007) 
Own Prepared Tax -0.013* 
(0.008) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
-0.016** 
(0.008) 
Age 0.011** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
Male -0.203*** 
(0.008) 
-0.202*** 
(0.008) 
-0.206*** 
(0.008) 
-0.199*** 
(0.008) 
Audit Results Announced  
 
-0.031*** 
(0.008) 
  
 
Audit Probability Announced 
X Audit Probability 
 0.067** 
(0.028) 
  
Audit Probability Announced 
X Lagged Audit 
 -0.022* 
(0.014) 
  
Audit Probability Not Announced 
X Lagged Audit 
  0.115*** 
(0.012) 
0.110*** 
(0.012) 
Unofficial Communication   0.045*** 
(0.008) 
 
 
Unofficial Message – 
Subjects Evaded 
   -0.036*** 
(0.005) 
Unofficial Message – 
Subjects Complied 
   0.042*** 
(0.007) 
Unofficial Message – 
Subjects Not Audited 
   -0.009*** 
(0.004) 
Unofficial Message – 
Subjects Audited 
   0.029*** 
(0.005) 
Wald statistic 2589.62*** 2504.06*** 2712.60*** 2926.41*** 
Log-likelihood -4816.65 -4700.10 -4652.72 -4589.87 
a The dependent variable is Compliance Rate.  The data constitute a panel, and estimation is 
conducted using feasible generalized least squares estimators.  In all estimations, the number of 
observations is 9454, the number of subjects (panels) is 326, and the number of time periods is 
29 (omitting period one for the lag operator).  The numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.  
Significance levels are denoted * 0.10, ** 0.05, and *** 0.01. 
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Appendix A: Income Earning Task Image 
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